

VZCZCXRO0091
RR RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0087/01 0241203
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 241203Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2959
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0439
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1118
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2396
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1499
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0855
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0590
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0600

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000087

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA,
DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR
DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR
CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2016

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [PREF](#) [ASEC](#) [CD](#) [SU](#)

SUBJECT: CHAD AND JUSTICE AND EQUALITY MOVEMENT MAKE UP

Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: During a two-week stay in N'Djamena, the President of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, shared his thoughts on the normalization of relations between Chad and the JEM, the Chadian-Sudanese conflict, prospects for peace at the negotiating table in Abuja, and his desire to have improved relations with the United States. Khalil reiterated his concerns that the Government of Sudan is not serious about achieving peace in Darfur, preferring instead to pursue a military solution that includes regime change in Chad. Discussions with Khalil reveal his national aspirations in Sudan and utilization of regional alliances to obtain them. End Summary.

- - - - -
NORMALIZING RELATIONS
- - - - -

¶2. (C) Justice and Equality Movement's President Dr. Khalil Ibrahim has spent the past two weeks in N'Djamena meeting with Chadian officials, including President Deby, and Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) faction leader Minni Minawi. Khalil told Ambassador and P/E officer that President Deby invited him to Chad as part of the process of repairing the strained relations between Chad and JEM on January 13. Part of the normalization process is securing the release of JEM prisoners in Chadian jails. According to Khalil, many of these prisoners have been in unknown jails, tortured, and thrown out of aircraft. Chadian authorities also have confiscated JEM vehicles and weapons and harassed JEM members traveling in and out of N'Djamena. Khalil said that JEM did not come to Chad seeking support, but to improve the relationship by building on talks started last October.

¶3. (C) Khalil explained that over the past two years, the poor relationship with President Deby had cost both Chad and JEM. Chadian efforts to split JEM included support for the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD), seizure of cars and weapons, and imprisonment of JEM members. However, geopolitics dictated that the Sudanese rebel movement must have access to Chad. In addition, it is important for JEM to have good ties with Chad as it is serving as a co-mediator in the negotiations. Finally, Khalil said lack of contact with Chadian officials has

resulted in misunderstandings and misperceptions that now need to be corrected.

VIEWS ON CHADIAN-SUDANESE TENSIONS

¶4. (C) Khalil stated that it is clear that the GOS is backing the Chadian rebels. He said that the GOS had recently delivered over 200 landcruisers, heavy gun machinery, and rocket launchers to the Chadian rebels. In addition, Khalil said that evidence of Chinese-manufactured weapons and the meticulous planning involved in the operation are indications that the GOS intends on changing the &whole system8. Khalil said that Chad does not need the help of JEM or SLM against the GOS-supported Chadian rebels because Chad's army is strong enough to defend itself. (Comment: In a later clarification, Khalil said that the fact that JEM and SLM control the Chad-Sudan border from Tine north to Bahai is important for Chad so that Deby can concentrate his forces in other areas. SLM and JEM are poor movements and cannot contribute militarily to Chad's defense. End. Comment.) In response to a question of JEM,s alleged support for Chadian military deserters, Khalil said that historically, intermarriage between tribes and clans means that many Chadian soldiers have spouses and families on both sides of the border. JEM is not recruiting Chadian soldiers, according to Khalil. However, over time, there are many Chadian military disaffected with the ruling Movement for Patriotic Salvation (MPS) that have joined JEM.

¶5. (C) The goal of the GOS is regime change in Chad, according to Khalil. The GOS plans to replace the entire

NDJAMENA 00000087 002 OF 003

system in Chad with an Arab government and Islamic system. Khalil said that Mahamat Nour is not the GOS,s answer to its Chadian problems, but just a tool by which it will replace Deby and his family. Khalil said that the GOS wants to replace the Deby family system to end Chadian support for the Darfurian rebel movements and undermine the internationally-supported peace process. The GOS believes by removing Deby that it can achieve a military solution to the situation in Darfur, according to Khalil. He added that similar to its actions in Darfur, the GOS is intent on cleansing the area of indigenous people to make room for Arabs, especially the Chadian Arabs now serving as jandjaweed. According to this calculation, the jandjaweed will move to Chad, become a ready reserve when needed, and avoid international prosecution because a newly-installed Sudanese-influenced government will refuse to turn them over to the International Criminal Court.

¶6. (C) Khalil believes that the border war will escalate after the African Union summit in Khartoum. The GOS wants as many heads of state to attend as possible. The movements will boycott the talks during the AU summit and will walk out if Bashir is elected to take over the AU. Khalil said that if Bashir becomes AU Chairman, the Darfur peace process will be destroyed. Khalil also described President Olusegun Obasanjo as having lost interest in the Darfur peace process. He urged the international community to encourage Obasanjo to do more.

COLLABORATIVE, REGIONAL APPROACH TO PEACE IN SUDAN

¶7. (C) Khalil described his approach to the peace process as comprehensive. He stated that JEM is not seeking to upset the Comprehensive Peace Agreement reached with the south. JEM does not want the south to cede any of its newly achieved rights obtained at Navaisha. Instead, JEM wants to ensure that other marginalized populations can gain their rights. He said that a collective approach for peace in Sudan must include other regions as the eastern people share the same

objectives and demands as Darfurians. He emphasized several times that peace in Sudan must include the eastern movements.

Khalil said that a truly comprehensive peace would begin with a revolving presidency, beginning with the south, which he views as the only way to keep Sudan united. Khalil said JEM is anxious about what it views as the northern government's plans to separate the south from the north. The only solution to preserving the CPA, in Khalil's view, is for Salva Kiir to become president.

WHY KHARTOUM IS AFRAID OF JEM

¶8. (C) Khalil said that JEM is more dangerous to the GOS than SLM because of its experience as government insiders, its ability to raise public awareness, its vision, and its ties to the eastern movements. According to Khalil, JEM is the best protector of Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM), who are coming to the government as outsiders. As a result, the NIF government is already in the process of destroying SPLM. Khalil stated that within 24 months, SPLM will ask for a premature self-determination.

KHALIL ON ABUJA PROCESS: ONE HAND CANNOT CLAP ALONE

¶9. (C) Khalil said that the GOS is not taking the peace process in Abuja seriously. He said that if the GOS genuinely wants peace, a deal can be concluded in one week. He admitted that the movements made some tactical mistakes by stating their bottom lines on issues up front and leaving no margin to negotiate. However, he said the movements did this because they felt under pressure from the international community to be upfront with their demands. As a result, Khalil said the movements' positions appear to the international observers as inflexible. In addition, some of

NDJAMENA 00000087 003 OF 003

the inflexibility is the result of the process through which the common negotiating positions are adopted.

¶10. (C) On power-sharing, Khalil restated the movements' positions. Darfur must be one administrative region. At the center, a rotational presidency and a supreme council of the six regions will ensure unity. He also added that Darfur and the east should each have vice presidencies and participation on a ministerial council. He reiterated the demand for full participation of Darfurians, based on their percentage of population, in the governance of Khartoum, civil service, and police and security forces. He said there are 12.5 million Darfurians, with one million living in Libya, and a majority of the population in the east are Darfurians.

¶11. (C) Khalil said that the wealth-sharing commission needs to secure free education, services, and basic infrastructure for all of Sudan in order to alleviate poverty and marginalization. The so-called red line for the movements is the reconstruction of destroyed villages, including better quality housing than previously existed, clearly delineated in a plan that includes budget allocations and a timeline. He said that the movements will not fight for a specific percentage of oil revenues if they can achieve reconstruction and assurances of improved infrastructure and services to the region.

¶12. (C) Regarding security arrangements, Khalil said that the movements must be able to keep their armies during the transition period, that the GOS must pay for the upkeep and logistics support for these troops, and that the jandjaweed question must be answered.

¶13. (C) The Ambassador asked Khalil when he would be going to the Abuja talks. Khalil said that he has a competent,

empowered team in place. He said he would go to Abuja when it was clear that the GOS was serious about negotiating a final deal.

- - - - -
JEM SEEKS BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES
- - - - -

¶14. (C) Another key theme of Khalil's meeting with the Ambassador was to improve JEM's relationship with US officials. Khalil categorically stated that JEM is an independent movement and does not belong to former Sudanese Minister Turabi. Khalil expressed his desire to send a delegation to the United States to dispel widely-held misperceptions of JEM that it is relatively small movement, interested in an Islamic agenda.

- - - - -
COMMENT
- - - - -

¶15. (C) From Khalil's perspective, the GOS is under no pressure to make a deal with the Darfurian movements. In subsequent meetings, he told us that the international community appears unwilling to pressure the GOS so the movements must reconsider their options. Khalil also believes that the framework for the peace deal will not be made in Abuja, but delivered to the negotiations. He also appears satisfied with his return to N'Djamena and better footing with the Chadian Government. Khalil deftly avoided discussing the formation of a Zaghawa coalition or the importance of demonstrating Zaghawa solidarity with Deby.

WALL